In this paper, we study a time-inconsistent stochastic optimal control problem with a recursive cost functional by a multi-person hierarchical differential game approach. An equilibrium strategy of this problem is constructed and a corresponding equilibrium Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB, for short) equation is established to characterize the associated equilibrium value function. Moreover, a well-posedness result of the equilibrium HJB equation is established under certain conditions.
Introduction
Let (Ω, F , F, P) be a complete filtered probability space on which a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion W (·) is defined, whose natural filtration is F = {F t } t 0 (augmented by all the P-null sets). Let T > 0. We denote D = (t, ξ) t ∈ [0, T ], and ξ is F t -measurable, R n -valued, with E|ξ| 2 < ∞ .
For any (t, ξ) ∈ D, we consider the following controlled stochastic differential equation (SDE, for short): . On the right hand side of (1.2), the first term is referred to as a discounted terminal cost, and the second term is referred to as a discounted running cost. We note that discount terms e
−λ(T −t)
and e −λ(s−t) appearing in the terminal cost and running cost are exponential functions which have the same parameter λ. We therefore call (1.2) a cost functional with an exponential discount. Now, let us state the following classical optimal control problem. J 0 (t, ξ; u(·)).
Problem (C)
If an admissible controlū(·) satisfies (1.3), it is called an optimal control for Problem (C) 0 with the initial pair (t, ξ). The corresponding state processX(·) and (X(·),ū(·)) are called an optimal state and an optimal pair. A function V : [0, T ] × R n → R is called a value function of Problem (C) 0 if (1.4) V (t, x) = J(t, x;ū(t)), P -a.s. , ∀ (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n .
For the above problem, it is standard that (see, for example, [22] ) ifū(·) is an optimal control for the initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D with the corresponding optimal state processX(·), then for any s ∈ [t, T ], 
This means that the restrictionū(·)| [s,T ] ofū(·) on [s,
T ] is an optimal control for the corresponding initial pair (s,X(s)). Such a property is referred to as the time-consistency of the optimal controlū(·), or the time-consistency of Problem (C) 0 .
If we let (Y 0 (·), Z 0 (·)) ≡ (Y 0 (· ; t, ξ, u(·)), Z 0 (· ; t, ξ, u(·))) be the adapted solution to the following (linear) backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE, for short): Y 0 (t) = E t e −λ(T −t) h 0 (X(T )) + T t e −λ(s−t) g 0 (s, X(s), u(s))ds = J 0 (t, ξ; u(·)).
Therefore, Y 0 (t) ≡ Y 0 (t; t, ξ, u(·)) is a representation of J 0 (t, ξ, u(·)). Further, from BSDE (1.5), we also have Y 0 (t) = E t h 0 (X(T )) + This reminds us the stochastic differential utility (SDU, for short) introduced by Duffie and Epstein in 1992 ( [4, 5] , see also [6] ), which is the continuous-time version of recursive utility ( [11] ). More precisely, for a terminal random payoff η (at time T ) and a consumption process c(·) on [t, T ] (which can be regarded as a control process), a corresponding SDU process Y (·) is a solution to the following equation:
(1.6) Y (s) = E s η + are replaced by some more general functions µ(T, t) and ν(s, t), respectively. We note that even if these functions are respectively replaced by exponential functions e −λ1(T −t) and e −λ2(s−t) , as long as λ 1 = λ 2 , the corresponding problem will already become time-inconsistent ( [16, 17] ). As suggested in [22, 23, 24, 25, 26] , instead of (1.2), one may consider cost functional (1.10) J(t, ξ; u(·)) = E t h(t, X(T )) + T t g(t, s, X(s), u(s))ds .
It is clear that the classical situation (1.2) corresponds to the following special case:
h(t, x) = e −λ(T −t) h 0 (x), g(t, s, x, u) = e −λ(s−t) g 0 (s, x, u).
However, we see easily that the above (1.10) does not contain the problems involving SDUs. In order to include problems involving SDUs, we now propose the following: 
Y (T ) = h(t, X(T )),
then we may let the cost functional to be (1.12) J(t, ξ; u(·)) = Y (t; t, ξ, u(·)) = E t h(t, X(T )) +
T t g(t, s, X(s), u(s), Y (s), Z(s))ds .
Let us make a couple of observations. Firstly, if g(t, s, x, u, y, z) ≡ g(t, s, x, u), then (1.12) is reduced to (1.10), and (1.11) is not necessary. Secondly, if h(t, x) ≡ h(x), g(t, s, x, u, y, z) ≡ g(s, x, u, y, z), then (1.11) is reduced to (1.8) and (1.12) coincides with (1.7), so that the corresponding optimal control problem becomes Problem (C).
Suggested by the above, we may now introduce the following controlled decoupled FBSDE:
Under some mild conditions, for any (t, ξ) ∈ D and u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], the above FBSDE admits a unique adapted solution (X(·), Y (·), Z(·)) ( [15] ). Then we may define the recursive cost functional by
and an optimal control problem can be posed. It is expected that such an optimal control problem is timeinconsistent. Therefore, finding an optimal control at any given initial pair (t, ξ) is not very useful. Instead, one should wisely find an equilibrium strategy which is time consistent and possesses certain kind of local optimality.
To find time-consistent equilibrium strategy, we adopt the method of multi-person differential game. The idea can be at least traced back to the work of Pollak [21] in 1968. Later, the approach was adopted and further developed by Ekeland-lazrak [7] , Yong [24, 26, 27 ], Björk-Murgoci [2] , and Björk-MurgociZhou [3] for various kinds of problems. Let us now elaborate the approach a little more carefully to our stochastic recursive cost case as follows, which has some substantial and interesting differences from the works mentioned above.
Firstly, we divide the whole time interval [0, T ] into N subintervals:
, with t 0 = 0, t N = T , and introduce an N -person differential game, where players are labeled from 1 through N . Player k takes over the system at time t k−1 from Player (k − 1), and controls the system on [t k−1 , t k ), then hand it over to Player (k + 1) at t k . The "sophisticated" recursive cost functional for Player k is defined through a BSDE on [t k−1 , t k ], whose coefficient/generator depends on his/her initial pair (t k−1 , X k (t k−1 )) with X k (t k−1 ) equal to X k−1 (t k−1 ) (the terminal state of Player (k − 1)) and whose terminal value at t k
based on the assumption that later players will play optimally with respect to their "sophisticated" recursive cost functionals. Therefore, the "sophisticated" recursive cost functionals are constructed recursively. On the other hand, although he/she will not control the system on [t k , T ], Player k will still "discounts" the future costs in his/her own way, due to the time-preference feature of the problem [24, 26, 27] . It turns out that each player faces a resulted time-consistent optimal control problem. Therefore, under suitable conditions, each player will have an optimal control defined on the corresponding subinterval. Then we could construct a partition-dependent equilibrium strategy and the corresponding partition-dependent equilibrium value function of the game.
Secondly, letting the mesh size of the partition tend to zero, we (at least formally could) get the limits called the time-consistent equilibrium strategy and time-consistent equilibrium value function of the original time-inconsistent optimal control problem. At the same time, a so-called equilibrium Hamilton-JacobiBellman equation (equilibrium HJB equation, for short) is also derived to characterize the time-consistent equilibrium value function. Moreover, in the case that the equilibrium HJB equation is well-posed, the formal convergence (as the mesh size goes to zero) of the relevant functions will become rigorous.
Finally, at the moment, to establish the well-posedness of the equilibrium HJB equation, we will assume that the diffusion term σ of the state equation does not depend on the control process u(·), beside some other mild conditions. The general case that σ contains the control process u(·) is still open and will be investigated in the future.
By the way, as we mentioned, the optimal control problem for every player (with the "sophisticated" recursive cost functional) is time-consistent. Thus, it is expected that one could use the classical approach to deal with them. To this end, we establish a stochastic verification theorem. To our best knowledge, there is no existing ready-to-use result which can be applied to our problem directly.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the preliminaries for our study. We recall the relationship between FBSDEs and PDEs, and establish a verification theorem for time-consistent optimal control problem with recursive cost functional. In Section 3, the time-inconsistent recursive stochastic optimal control problem is formulated. Then we introduce and solve the multi-person differential game in Section 4, which leads to an approximate time-consistent equilibrium strategy for the original problem. By letting the mesh size of the partition go to zero, we also formally obtain an equilibrium strategy and a characterization of the equilibrium value function in terms of the equilibrium HJB equation. Finally, the well-posedness of the equilibrium HJB equation is established under proper conditions.
Preliminaries
We introduce the following notation:
Let U ⊆ R m be a nonempty set, which could be bounded or unbounded. Let maps b : 
The following standard result shows that FBSDE (1.13) is well-posed.
Before going further, we introduce some notations. Let S n ⊆ R n×n be the set of all (n × n) symmetric matrices. Let (2.1)
where the superscript ⊤ denotes the transpose of vectors or matrices. We note that, since U is not necessarily compact, inf u∈U H(τ, t, x, u, θ, p, P ) may be infinite on the whole space
to Yong [24] , we introduce the following assumption.
(H2) There exists a map ψ :
For more explanations and comments on the above Assumption (H2), one is referred to [24] .
FBSDEs and PDEs
As preparations, we begin with the following family of FBSDEs without involving controls, which are timeconsistent and parameterized by the initial pairs (t, ξ) ∈ D:
Note that, under Assumption (H1) (ignoring t and u), by Proposition 2.1, (2.2) admits a unique adapted
We point out that Assumption (H1) can be substantially relaxed still guaranteeing the existence and uniqueness of the adapted solution to FBSDE (2.2). As suggested in [19, 18, 14] , the family of FBSDEs (2.2) is closely linked to the following semi-linear partial differential equation (PDE, for short):
where, for simplicity, we use the notation H defined in (2.1) omitting τ and u.
We denote
The following result will be used below.
Proof. For any given initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D, noting that X(·) is the solution to the forward equation in (2.2), by applying Itô's formula to Θ(· , X(·)), we get
By the definition of function H (see (2.1) ignoring τ and u), and noticing Θ(· , ·) satisfies PDE (2.3), the above equation can be rewritten as
By the uniqueness of the backward equation in (2.2), we have
Consequently, by letting s = t, we obtain our conclusion.
Problem (C) and verification theorem
In this subsection, we consider the controlled form of (2.2), i.e., for any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D, the controlled FBSDE is given by (2.4)
For any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D and any control process u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], under Assumption (H1) ignoring t, Proposition 2.1 works again to ensure the existence and uniqueness of solution to (2.4). As in Section 1, now we introduce the following recursive cost functional
and present a result about Problem (C).
Comparing with PDE (2.3) which is related to the situation without involving control processes, the family of controlled FBSDEs (2.4) are closely linked to the following so-called Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB, for short) equation which is a fully non-linear PDE:
where, for simplicity, we use the notation H defined in (2.1) ignoring τ once again.
The following result is called a verification theorem for Problem (C) which can be regarded as a generalization of Theorem 2.1.
is a classical solution to the HJB equation
Moreover, let (X(·),ū(·)) be a state-control pair with (t, ξ) such that
In another word, V (· , ·) is the value function of Problem (C), and (X(·),ū(·)) is an optimal pair of Problem (C) for the initial pair (t, ξ).
Proof. For any (t, ξ) ∈ D, let (X(·), u(·)) be an admissible pair with (t, ξ). From the HJB equation (2.6),
On the other hand, by applying Itô's formula to V (· , X(·)), we have
By the definition of function H (see (2.1) ignoring τ ), the above equation can be rewritten as
Noticing (2.10), by the Comparison Theorem of BSDEs (see El Karoui-Peng-Quenez [8] ), we obtain
Particularly, by taking s = t, the above implies (2.7).
Next, if the admissible pair (X(·),ū(·)) satisfies (2.8), then the equal sign in (2.10) holds, and (2.11) becomes
By the uniqueness of adapted solutions to BSDE, we have
Letting s = t, we obtain (2.9) and the proof is completed.
Time-Inconsistent Problem and Equilibrium Strategy
In this section, we formulate the time-inconsistent recursive stochastic optimal control problem, and introduce the notion of equilibrium strategy for the problem.
For convenience, let us rewrite the state equation (1.13) and the recursive cost functional (1.14) as follows:
We pose the following problem.
J(t, ξ; u(·)).
As mentioned in Section 1, Problem (N) is time-inconsistent. Therefore, instead of find an optimal control for a given initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D, we would like to find a time-consistent equilibrium strategy for Problem (N) over the whole time interval [0, T ]. Our approach is inspired by that developed in [24] , for a time-inconsistent optimal control problem of stochastic differential equations (SDE, for short), with Bolza type cost functional (We now have a recursive cost functional).
). Similar to [24] , we present the definition of time-consistent equilibrium strategy of Problem (N) as follows. (i) (Time-consistency) For any x ∈ R n , the following closed-loop system:
(ii) (Local approximate optimality) There exists a family of partitions
and a family of maps Ù
with Ù Π being locally optimal in the following sense:
For any x ∈ R n , the following FBSDE:
admits a unique adapted solution:
where
is the unique adapted solution to the following FBSDE defined on the interval
In the above,X(·) is called a time-consistent equilibrium state process,ū(·) ≡ Ù(· ,X(·)) is called a timeconsistent equilibrium control for the initial state x, and (X(·),ū(·)) is called a time-consistent equilibrium pair of Problem (N). It is easy to see that the convergence (3.6) implies
We also call Ù Π (· , ·) an approximate equilibrium strategy of Problem (N) associated with the partition Π.
Let us make a couple of comments on the above long-looking definition.
• The state equation (3.3) admits a unique solution under Ù(· , ·) means that as a strategy, Ù(· , ·) is time-consistent. It is interesting to know that such a strategy is of closed-loop nature, in the sense that it is independent of the initial state.
• Condition (3.4) means that the outcome Ù
is locally optimal in a proper sense. Due to the fact that the global optimal control is time-inconsistent, such kind of local optimal control should be the best that one can obtain.
Multi-Person Differential Games
In this section, we shall construct a family Ù Π (· , ·) of approximate equilibrium strategies which plays the role as in Definition 3.1. To this end, we consider a family of multi-person differential games, called Problem (G Π ), associated with the partition Π : 0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t N −1 < t N = T . In the game, there are N players labeled from 1 to N . Player k controls the system on the interval [t k−1 , t k ) by selecting his/her own admissible control
We now carry out the details below.
Player N -a classical optimal control problem
In what follows, we denote
Let us start with Player N who controls the system on [t N −1 , t N ], the last time interval of the partition Π. For any admissible control u
(Ω; R n ), the controlled FBSDE for Player N reads
whose unique adapted solution is denoted by
emphasizing the dependence on (ξ N −1 , u N (·)). The recursive cost functional is given by (4.2)
The optimal control problem for Player N can be stated as follows.
Problem (C N ) is a standard stochastic optimal control problem with recursive cost functional, which can be solved by the stochastic verification theorem (see Theorem 2.2). More precisely, under proper conditions, the following HJB equation admits a classical solution V Π (· , ·):
where H is defined by (2.1). Recalling the map ψ introduced in (H2), we define
Let us assume that for
(Ω; R n ), the following FBSDE (which is a closed-loop system):
admits a unique adapted solution
Then by Theorem 2.2, (X 
Player (N − 1) -a sophisticated optimal control problem
We now look at Player (N − 1) who takes over the system from Player (N − 2), controls the system on [t N −2 , t N −1 ) and hand it over to Player N at t N −1 . Player (N − 1) knows that Player N will play optimally through the optimal strategy Ù Π (· , ·) (which is already defined on [t N −1 , t N ] × R n ). Due to the subjective time-preference, Player (N − 1) still "discounts" the future costs in his/her own way despite he/she will not control the system beyond t N −1 . According to this viewpoint, the controlled FBSDE of Player (N − 1) is given by (4.6)
be the adapted solution of (4.6), depending on the initial
(Ω; R n ) and the control
. Then we define the sophisticated recursive cost functional of Player (N − 1) by the following:
where the operation "⊕" is defined by (3.5) and Ù Π (· , ·) is defined by (4.4). Clearly, the above is different from the "naive" recursive cost functional J(t N −2 , ξ N −2 ; u(·)) defined by (1.14). We emphasize that for different control u
will be different, which will result in the FBSDE on [t N −1 , t N ] having a different initial condition for X N −1 (·).
Now we pose the following problem for Player (N − 1).
Let us make some careful observation which will reveal the essential difference between the naive and sophisticated recursive cost functionals. Recall that the original controlled FBSDE on [t N −2 , t N ] is given by (4.9)
and the naive recursive cost functional is given by (4.10)
If t N −2 is fixed (as a parameter), the above will lead to a time-consistent optimal control problem with recursive cost functional. Consequently, if ( X N −2 (·), u N −2 (·)) is an optimal pair (corresponding to the initial pair (t N −2 , ξ N −2 )), then
with V N −2 (· , ·) satisfying the following HJB equation:
Comparing (4.3) and (4.12), we see that on 
Inspired by Theorem 2.1, we introduce the following PDE:
(4.14)
If the above admits a unique classical solution Θ N −1 (· , ·), then the following representation holds:
In particular,
Consequently, the sophisticated cost functional will have the representation
being the adapted solution to the following decoupled FBSDE:
Then Problem (C N −1 ) becomes a standard recursive stochastic optimal control problem (on [t N −2 , t N −1 ]). Let the following HJB equation admits a classical solution:
Similar to (4.4), we define
We assume the following FBSDE (4.21)
admits a unique adapted solution. Then by Theorem 2.2, (X We write (4.4) and (4.20) compactly as
where ℓ Π (·) is defined by (3.7). From the above, we see that, respectively restricted in [t N −2 , t N −1 ) and
is an optimal strategy of Player (N − 1) and Player N , respectively. However, in general
is not an optimal strategy on the whole interval [t N −2 , t N ]. We call Ù Π (· , ·) an equilibrium strategy
is called an equilibrium pair on [t N −2 , t N ], wherē
Player k and equilibria of Problem (G Π )
The above procedure can be continued recursively. Suppose we have constructed the equilibrium strategy Ù Π (· , ·) and the equilibrium value function
. We now extend them
Player k controls the system and he/she knows that later players will play through the equilibrium strategy Ù Π (· , ·), and meanwhile Player k "discounts" the future costs in his/her own way. Hence, for any
(Ω; R n ) and u k (·) ∈ U [t k−1 , t k ], the controlled FBSDE for Player k reads:
is the adapted solution to the above. Then the sophisticated recursive cost functional of Player k is defined as follows:
The optimal control problem of Player k is given by
To get a better representation for the sophisticated recursive cost functional of Player k, we introduce the following PDE associated with a part of (4.23):
Under proper conditions, PDE (4.25) admits a classical solution Θ k (· , ·), and Theorem 2.1 leads to 
Under proper conditions, the following HJB equation
Moreover, we assume the following FBSDE (4.30)
admits a unique adapted solution. Then, by Theorem 2.2, Ù Π (· , ·) defined by (4.29) is an optimal strategy of Player k. Further, both V
By induction, we are able to obtain V
For the later purpose of taking the limits, let us summarize the procedure of construction.
Step
as follows (recalling ψ(·) from (H2)):
Step 2. Define the representation function
Note that (4.33) is different from (4.31) since t N −1 is replaced by t N −2 . Consequently, in general, the following fails:
In particular, the following could fail:
Now, define the value function V Π (· , ·) on [t N −2 , t N −1 )×R n to be the solution to the following HJB equation:
Due to the fact that (4.35) fails,
Step 3. Define the representation function Θ N −2 (· , ·) on [t N −2 , t N ] × R n by the following equation:
Note that the time interval for (4.38
. Also, unlike (4.36), t N −3 appears, instead of t N −2 . Thus, in general, the following fails:
Now, we define the value function V Π (· , ·) on [t N −3 , t N −2 ) × R n to be the solution to the following HJB equation:
The rest steps now are clear.
We write the constructed equilibrium strategy on the whole interval [0, T ] for Problem (G Π ) as follows:
Then for any given x ∈ R n , let X Π (·) be the solution to the following SDE:
Correspondingly, in (4.30), we take ·) ) be the adapted solution to the following BSDE:
Then from (4.23), (4.26) and (4.30), we have
is an optimal strategy of Problem (C k ), then (3.4) holds true. If we setū
can be regarded as a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding N -person noncooperative differential game (see [24] for details).
The formal limits
Through an observation on (4.25) and (4.28), together with (4.29), we see that Θ k (· , ·) can be extended
Then from (4.25) and (4.28), we see that extended Θ k (· , ·) satisfies
Let us define (4.49)
Then Θ Π (· , · , ·) satisfies the following PDE:
where H Π (τ, t, x, u, θ, p, P ) = tr a(t, x, u)P + b(t, x, u), p +g Π τ, t, x, u, θ, p ⊤ σ(t, x, u) ,
Since for any k = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
Now, we would like to study the behavior when Π → 0 formally to get the limit equations. In the next section, we will prove the formal limits can be made rigorous under some conditions. We introduce the following assumption temporarily.
uniformly for (τ, t, x) in any compact sets.
Under (H3), with the help of (H2), we also have
uniformly for (t, x) in any compact sets, where
Therefore, we have lim
is the solution to the following SDE:
is an F-progressively measurable process with continuous paths such that E sup
where (Ȳ (t, ·),Z(t, ·)) is the solution the following BSDE:
Furthermore, it is clear
By taking limits, we have
which coincides with (3.8). By Definition 3.1, Ù(· , ·) is a time-consistent equilibrium strategy, and
or in the differential form:
where H(·) is defined by (2.1) and Ù(· , ·) is defined by (4.51). We call (4.56) or (4.55) the equilibrium Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (equilibrium HJB equation, for short) of Problem (N).
5 Well-Posedness of the Equilibrium HJB Equation
In this section, we will present the well-posedness of equation (4.56) to some extent. First of all, some observations on (4.56) are made as follows:
• System (4.56) is a fully nonlinear PDE, but not in a classical form. Note that both Θ(τ, t, x) and Θ(t, t, x) appear in the equation at the same time, where Θ(t, t, x) is the restriction of Θ(τ, t, x) on τ = t, which make the existing theory of fully nonlinear PDEs cannot be applied directly to (4.56) for its wellposedness.
• The recursive costs in our time-inconsistent control problem (N) bring some differences from the problem studied in [24] , particularly reflecting on the equilibrium HJB equation. If Θ(t, t, x) could be obtained from an independent way, the equilibrium HJB equation developed in [24] is in fact a linear PDE with respect to Θ(τ, t, x) where τ could be regarded as a parameter. While in the current situation, it is different now. In fact, (4.56) will still be a nonlinear one in spite of Θ(t, t, x) is known in advance.
• Notice the expression: Ù(t, x) = ψ t, t, x, Θ(t, t, x), Θ x (t, t, x), Θ xx (t, t, x) . From the definition of ψ (see Assumption (H2)), it is clear that the dependence of σ on the control variable u leads to the appearance of Θ xx (t, t, x) in Ù(t, x). It turns out that the appearance of Θ xx (t, t, x) will bring some essential difficulties in establishing the well-posedness of equilibrium HJB equation. At the moment, we are not able to overcome the difficulty. We hope to come back in our future publications. In the current paper, having formally derived the general equilibrium HJB equation, we will establish its well-posedness for a special, but still important case. More precisely, we assume that
in the following study.
Under (5.1), the equilibrium HJB equation (4.56) reads
To avoid heavy notations, we simplify (5.2) as follows:
Next, we introduce some spaces. For any α ∈ (0, 1), we let
• C α (R n ) be the set of all continuous functions: ϕ : R n → R such that
• C 1+α (R n ) be the set of all continuously differentiable functions: ϕ : R n → R such that
• C 2+α (R n ) be the set of all twice continuously differential functions: ϕ : R n → R such that
We also need the following assumption.
and h : [0, T ] × R n → R are continuous and bounded. Moreover, there exists a constant L > 0 such that
Furthermore, a(t, x) −1 exists for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n and there exist constants λ 0 , λ 1 > 0 such that
For any v(· , ·) ∈ C([0, T ]; C 1 (R n )), we consider the following semi-linear PDE parameterized by τ ∈ [0, T ]:
which admits a unique solution by the classical theory. In order to derive the well-posedness of (5.4), we will utilize the above semi-linear PDE to establish a contraction mapping from v(· , ·) to V (· , ·), where
The details will be presented in the following theorem. Proof. By the fundamental solution theory of parabolic PDE (see Friedman [9] ), for any v(· , ·) ∈ C([0, T ]; C 1 (R n )), the solution of (5.5) can be expressed as We now split the rest of the proof into several steps.
Step 1. We prove Θ x (τ, t, x) is bounded, i.e., |Θ x (τ, t, x)| K(1 + h(τ, ·) C 1 (R n ) ), (t, x) ∈ [τ, T ] × R n .
Combined (5.8) with the method of integration by parts, we get (5.10) Gronwall's inequality works again to yield
We note that the constant K > 0 appearing in the above is independent of (τ, t) ∈ D[0, T ].
Step 3. Denoting V i (t, x) = Θ i (t, t, x) (i = 1, 2) and taking τ = t in (5.19), we get Finally, by the classical theory of PDE, and the regularity of the above expression, we get Θ(τ, t, x) is C 2+α in x, C We have proved the expected convergence (5.22).
